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Trade has played a major role in U.S. agriculture throughout the twentieth cen- 
tury. The share of  annual U.S. wheat production that was exported rose from 
approximately 25 percent at the beginning of the century to 60 percent by the 
beginning  of  the  1980s. The federal  government has supported  agricultural 
production  in general, and exports in particular,  with several programs. The 
export programs aim to achieve three basic goals: maintain appropriate surplus 
levels of agricultural commodities, increase foreign demand for U.S. products, 
and  support  humanitarian  causes.  Export  programs  have  taken  four  basic 
forms: export subsidies (in kind or in cash) that have allowed domestic prices 
to exceed world prices and countered subsidization by US.  competitors; export 
credit and credit guarantee programs that have assisted countries with foreign 
exchange difficulties; food aid programs, directed toward countries suffering 
from hunger; and nonprice promotion programs that have attempted to increase 
foreign demand for U.S. products. The focus of this paper is on the effects of 
the most recent export subsidization program, known as the Export Enhance- 
ment Program (EEP). Since the primary commodity sold under this program 
is wheat (wheat sales account for approximately 80 percent of total EEP sales), 
we concentrate our analysis on the wheat market. 
The EEP was  established  by  the  secretary of agriculture  in the  spring of 
1985 in reaction to the continuing decline in U.S. agricultural exports and the 
increase in government stocks of grain. The program is considered a success 
by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the majority of  research- 
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ers. This evaluation is based on two facts. First, coincident with the implemen- 
tation of EEP legislation, U.S. wheat exports have increased significantly. Sec- 
ond, the majority of  existing studies on the effects of the EEP find positive, 
albeit small, effects of the program on exports, revenues, and domestic prices. 
The method employed in such studies is almost exclusively that of simulation.' 
The wheat market is modeled in detail, and the equilibrium conditions for the 
world market are derived; next, the equilibrium is computed under alternative 
scenarios concerning the relevant policy variables. Comparing the outcomes 
corresponding to scenarios with and without the EEP provides an estimate of 
the effects of the program. Simulation studies typically consider one year at a 
time; owing to the reference to different years and the sensitivity of the results 
to modeling assumptions and functional forms, a comparison of results across 
studies is often difficult. The analysis is complicated by the complexity of farm 
programs; the EEP was introduced in conjunction with other changes in basic 
farm support. 
In this paper, we employ a different method to analyze the effect of a variety 
of factors on the world wheat market and U.S. producers. Rather than relying 
on simulation analysis, we explore time-series data for the period 1970-94 to 
investigate the relation between export performance, subsidies, and other fac- 
tors. Our analysis  will attempt to address  the following  questions:  (1) How 
important are relative  cost changes in  explaining  the  performance of  U.S. 
wheat producers prior to the EEP program? (2)  Which was primarily responsi- 
ble for the decline in U.S. production  and export shares in the world wheat 
market in the early 1980s-relative  cost changes or European subsidization? 
(3) Do US.  policies toward wheat, such as price guarantees, have detectable 
effects on  the  behavior  of  wheat growers? (4) How  important  are policy 
changes and relative cost changes in explaining the recovery of production and 
exports after 1985? 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 10.  I, we pro- 
vide an overview of the U.S. wheat market and the EEP and summarize the 
results of the literature to date on the effects of the program; we conclude this 
section by describing our own approach. In section 10.2, we describe the data 
used in the empirical analysis. Section 10.3 reports and interprets the results, 
and section 10.4 concludes. 
10.1  Overview of the Export Enhancement Program 
10.1.1  The U.S. Wheat Market 
Understanding the determinants of domestic supply and demand is a prereq- 
uisite for studying exports in any market.  Domestic  demand comprises two 
1. Examples of  such studies include Ananla, Bohman, and Carter (1992), Brooks, Devadoss. 
and Myers (1990), Seitzinger and Paarlberg (1989a, 1989b, 1990). and Haley (1989). 275  Causes and Consequences of the EEP for Wheat 
major components: private demand and demand for stocks. Private demand is 
fairly stable and predictable since policy reduces price fluctuations through the 
holding of stocks. Stocks are held both commercially (known as “free” stocks) 
and by  the federal government. Government  stockholding  is a major tool of 
U.S.  agricultural  policy.  The Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC)  buys 
wheat from farmers participating in price-support programs at a specified price 
called the loan rate, in whatever quantities necessary to cause the market price 
to rise to the loan rate. Thus, the loan rate becomes a floor on U.S. prices. In 
periods  when market prices exceed loan rates, accumulation  of  government 
stocks is low. If private market prices would tend below the loan rate, on the 
other hand, farmers would have incentive to sell to the CCC until market prices 
equaled the loan rate, leading to rapid growth in government stocks. In addition 
to the loan rate, the government  uses target prices to support farm income; 
farmers receive deficiency payments equal to the difference between the target 
price and the maximum of the loan rate and market price. 
The domestic supply of wheat is the product of acreage planted and yield 
per acre. The acreage devoted to wheat will generally depend on wheat market 
conditions in recent years and overall farm policy variables. During the 1980s, 
farmers participating in agricultural support programs were subject to require- 
ments that limited the acreage for wheat growing. While a high loan rate might 
encourage production, the fact that participation in the program is conditional 
on acreage restrictions makes the connection between loan rates and acreage 
uncertain. It will depend on the set-aside requirements that are associated with 
any particular loan rate. It is possible that high loan rates encourage participa- 
tion in the program, which then imposes sufficiently stringent set-asides that 
acreage declines with the loan rate. Although yield is partially determined by 
exogenous factors such as weather conditions and soil quality, it may also be 
influenced by behavior; when market conditions are favorable, owing to strong 
export demand, farmers can partly overcome the effect of acreage restrictions 
on production by using resources more intensively to increase yield. 
The description  given  above of  the  US. wheat  market demonstrates the 
channels through which domestic policy instruments influence exports. A high 
loan rate, for example, increases market price, inducing an increase in domes- 
tic production, provided that acreage restrictions are not too strong. But higher 
loan rates, and thus domestic prices, can make exports to world markets less 
desirable. The excess of domestic supply over private domestic demand is more 
likely to be absorbed by  a rise in government stocks. As a result, one would 
generally expect loan rates to be positively related to production volume (for 
a given acreage at least) and government stocks and inversely  related to ex- 
ports. Since the value of the dollar dictates the relative cost advantage of U.S. 
producers on the world market, it, too, should influence acreage, production, 
and export decisions. All else equal, a weak dollar implies a higher dollar price 
on the world wheat market and greater incentive to plant, produce, and export 
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Fig. 10.1 
Source: World Wheat Situation and Outlook Yearbook. 
U.S. wheat, 1970-94: Production, exports, and ending stocks 
10.1.2  Historical Background 
The EEP was enacted during a period of financial distress for farmers, char- 
acterized  by  declining land values, a significant loss of export markets and 
farm income, and a growing surplus of government stocks. Figure 10.1 depicts 
wheat production, exports, and government stocks for the period  1970-94; 
while exports were relatively stable during the early 1970s and soared during 
the second part of that decade, they started faltering in  1981; between crop 
years 198  1-82  and 1985-86, the export volume fell from 1,77  1 to 909 million 
bushels.  During  the  same period,  government  stocks increased  steadily  to 
reach a peak level of 1,905 million bushels in  1985. 
Several factors contributed to these developments. On the domestic side, 
high legislated loan rate levels for wheat (fig. 10.2) increased the incentive to 
sell to the CCC. On the international side, the strong appreciation of the dollar 
in the early 1980s eroded the competitiveness of U.S. wheat exports relative to 
foreign-produced  wheat.  Figure  10.3  depicts  three  alternative,  weighted- 
average real exchange rate indices for wheat markets, one against the currenc- 
ies of the major importing countries (Japan, Brazil, Morocco, Nigeria, Egypt, 
India, etc.), one against the currencies of  the major wheat competitors (Can- 
ada, Argentina, Australia, and the European Community), and a combined in- 
dex that measures the value of the dollar in the overall world agricultural trade 
market.'All  three indices increased sharply between 1980 and 1985. Together, 
2. These trade-weighted indices arc constructed as follows. First, the current exchange rate for 
each country (in units  per dollar) is adjusted by taking the ratio of  the same-period CPI in the 277  Causes and Consequences of the EEP for Wheat 
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Fig. 10.2  U.S. wheat, 1970-94:  Market price, loan rate, and target price 
Source: World Wheut Situation and Outlook Yearbook. 
the high loan rates and strong dollar shifted sales away from export markets 
and toward government stocks. 
Other factors held responsible for the situation in the export markets were 
the debt problems and slow income growth in many importing countries and 
the  extensive  subsidization  of  wheat  exports by  the European Community 
(EC). The EC subsidies took the form of export restitutions paid to exporters 
to compensate for any difference between the world market price for wheat 
and  an internal  price  floor. Under  the Common Agricultural  Policy  (CAP), 
intervention  prices-the  prices guaranteed on EC sales-are  set. Quantities 
not consumed domestically are sold in the international markets at going world 
prices. The difference between the world price and the EC intervention price 
is the export restitution. Thanks in part to the extensive subsidization, the EC 
switched from being a net importer of wheat until  1974 to becoming a major 
U.S. competitor in the world wheat markets in the 1980s. In addition, the ex- 
change rate swings that worked against U.S. exports worked in favor of Euro- 
pean producers. 
Against this background, the Food Security Act of 1985, which outlined the 
farm policy for crop years  1986-90,  set out to reduce government stocks and 
United States to that of  the country in question. Then, the percentage change from the base period 
(1980) is multiplied  by  a  weight. The  geometric  mean  of  these  changes  constitutes the  real 
weighted exchange rate index. The weights used in the construction of the three indices are the 
average dollar shares of U.S. exports from 1983 to 1985 for the customer-based index, the world 
less U.S. shares in wheat exports for the competitor-based index, and U.S. market shares for the 
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Source: World Wheat Situation and Outlook Yearbook. 
Exchange rate indices: Weighted average, annual, 1970-90 
improve the situation in the export markets through a series of measures. A 
reduction in the loan rates was aimed at lowering U.S. prices for wheat, making 
the United States more competitive in the export markets while reducing the 
growth in government stocks. To maintain farm income support, target prices 
were frozen at the 1985 level for crop year 1986-87  and slowly declined after- 
ward. To make exports more competitive,  the EEP was established  and de- 
signed in such a way as to simultaneously contribute to the reduction of gov- 
ernment stocks. Under the original design of the program, government-owned 
surplus commodities were to be paid as bonuses  to exporters  to allow them 
to lower the prices of U.S. agricultural products in specific markets. By  1989, 
however, the government stocks were reduced to such a level that payment in 
kind was no longer feasible, and cash subsidies replaced the old system. The 
EEP was further designed as a targeted  subsidization program; the targeted 
markets were ones where U.S. competitors, the European Community in par- 
ticular, heavily subsidized their exports. 
The EEP was initially codified as a three-year export subsidy program; dur- 
ing this time frame, a total of  $2 billion worth of surplus commodities was to 
be made available to exporters as bonuses. Later, the overall amount of bonuses 
was limited to a maximum of  $1 .5 billion. In  1987, however, the USDA an- 
nounced that the program would continue once the authorized $1.5 billion was 
exhausted. In fact, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of  1988 au- 
thorized  an additional $1 billion in commodities, raising the ceiling to $2.5 
billion. By the end of  1990, approximately  $2.9 billion had been allocated to 279  Causes and Consequences of the EEP for Wheat 
subsidize US.  agricultural exports. The 1990 Farm Bill established minimum 
expenditures of $500 million per year for 1991-95.  An additional $1 billion 
would  be  available  if  GATT  negotiations  failed  or  if  no  agreement  were 
reached by 1992. 
10.1.3  Criteria for the EEP 
The Foreign Agricultural  Service (FAS) of  the USDA, which administers 
the program, specified four criteria for evaluating sales under the EEP. These 
were as follows: 
I. Additionality.  Sales  under  the  EEP should  increase  agricultural  exports 
above the level that would have occurred in the absence of the program. 
2. Targeting. The EEP is not a global export program; subsidies are to be tar- 
geted to markets that the EC heavily  subsidizes. This is an important feature 
of the EEP since it implies that marginal exports are unlikely to be eligible 
for subsidies. 
3. Budget neutrality. Budget  outlays  should not  increase  beyond  what they 
would have been in the absence of the program. The original design of the EEP 
as an in-kind subsidy program served this purpose directly as no cash payments 
were made to exporters; on the contrary, the government saved on the storage 
costs of the surplus commodities.  In later years, even though cash payments 
replaced in-kind bonuses, the EEP can be viewed as a substitute to domestic 
support payments; by increasing export sales and thus supporting higher wheat 
market  prices,  the  program  reduces  the  amount  of  deficiency  payments  to 
farmers. 
4. Cost eflectiveness. The last criterion is rather vague as it specifies that EEP 
sales should result in a net gain to the overall economy. It has been a subject 
of  intense  debate  in the  literature  under  which conditions  export  subsidies 
increase national welfare (for an overview, see Anania, Bohman,  and Carter 
1992); but the U.S. wheat market does not fit the theoretical framework of any 
of the models that provide a justification for such subsidies. 
In late 1989, the FAS reformulated the guidelines for approval of EEP sales to 
emphasize the EEP’s trade policy objectives: further the U.S. negotiating strat- 
egy in the Uruguay Round by  countering competitors’ unfair trade practices, 
and develop, maintain, and expand markets for U.S. agricultural products. 
10.1.4  Implementation of the EEP 
The USDA uses a flexible multistage process to determine and award sub- 
sidies to exporting firms. First, the FAS receives and reviews proposals from 
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governments  before  selecting  countries  and  commodities  to  target. An  ap- 
proved proposal is announced as an initiative, specifying the targeted country, 
the commodity, and the maximum quantity (e.g., 300,000 metric tons) that can 
be sold under the EEP. 
Next, the FAS uses information based on market intelligence reports to set 
minimum acceptable sale prices and maximum bonuses. The minimum price 
is one that is competitive  with  the  prices of  alternative suppliers. The FAS 
also estimates the U.S. domestic price plus freight and handling to a particular 
destination. The difference between the minimum price and the US.  price rep- 
resents the maximum acceptable bonus. To promote competition  among ex- 
porting firms, neither minimum prices nor maximum bonuses are announced 
publicly. 
After the initiative is announced, U.S. exporting firms compete for sales in 
the foreign markets through an FAS-administered bidding process. In particu- 
lar, exporters  negotiate  with  the  targeted  country  to determine the  quality, 
quantity, and price of  wheat that they will deliver. This information  is sub- 
mitted as a bid to the FAS. If the price specified in the bid is lower than the 
minimum acceptable price set by  the FAS, the bid is rejected. If  the price is 
higher, the FAS compares the bonus amount to the maximum acceptable bo- 
nus. If the exporter’s bonus is higher, the bid is rejected. A rejected bid can be 
revised and resubmitted. If the bid passes both the price and the bonus tests, 
the FAS compares its bonus amount to the bonus amounts of all acceptable 
bids received and awards the subsidies in ascending order of bonuses until the 
approved quantity is filled. 
Firms with successful bids export and receive EEP subsidies. Until  1989, 
these subsidies took the form of commodity certificates with value equal to the 
per-unit bonus times the amount of wheat sold to the targeted  country. Ex- 
porting firms could exchange the certificates for an equivalent value of surplus 
commodities in government storage or sell them. After  1989, the commodity 
certificates were replaced by cash subsidies. 
10.1.5  Activity under the EEP 
As mentioned  above, the  main  commodity  sold under the EEP is wheat; 
other commodities include barley (7 percent of total EEP sales), wheat flour, 
sorghum, rice, poultry, dairy cattle, and eggs. 
In the first year of the program (May-September  1985), four North African 
countries (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Yemen) were targeted. Over the next 
four fiscal years, the number  of  countries  grew  to sixty-five. No additional 
countries have been targeted since 1988. The major recipients are the Soviet 
Union (27 percent of total EEP sales), China (19 percent), and Algeria, Egypt, 
and Morocco (a combined 28 percent). The other sixty countries account for 
the remaining 26 percent of EEP wheat sales. It is interesting to note that the 
two major recipients (the Soviet Union and China) were originally excluded 
from the EEP. Both countries reacted to the exclusion by refusing to buy U.S. 281  Causes and Consequences of the EEP for Wheat 
wheat; as a result, the U.S. market shares dropped from 34 percent in 1984 to 
8 percent in 198.5 and 1 percent in 1986 in China and from 22 percent in 1984 
to  I percent in 1985 and 5 percent in 1986 in the Soviet Union. The decline in 
market shares was reversed in 1987, when both countries became eligible for 
the EEP. Critics of the EEP view these particular episodes in China and the 
Soviet Union as evidence that  the United States lacks market  power in the 
world wheat market and that it cannot therefore act as a price-discriminating 
monopolist (see Anania, Bohman, and Carter 1992). The inability to price dis- 
criminate reduces the likelihood that U.S. welfare is increased by subsidizing 
exports. 
EEP subsidy levels (average bonus as a percentage of  average sales price) 
vary  substantially  by  commodity, country, and year. For wheat, the average 
subsidy  level over the entire period  the EEP has been  in effect is about 27 
percent; the year 1987 is associated with the highest subsidies (43 percent). A 
comparison across countries shows that the Soviet Union  and other Eastern 
European countries successfully negotiated the higher per-ton  subsidies, fol- 
lowed by North Africa and China. Latin American and Middle Eastern coun- 
tries  received  lower than  average subsidies.  In  general,  subsidy  levels have 
been higher for the countries in which the EC has been more competitive. 
Since the implementation of  the EEP, U.S. wheat exports have increased 
significantly; the fastest growth occurred between  1985 and 1988, when ex- 
ports  went  from  twenty-five  to forty-three metric  tons (see also fig.  10.1 
above). EEP sales during this period accounted for approximately 50 percent 
of total U.S. wheat exports, but, as with subsidy levels, there was substantial 
variation across years and countries. The maximum EEP share was reached in 
1987,  when the EEP accounted for approximately 74 percent of wheat exports. 
Of course, this does not imply that, without the EEP, U.S. exports would have 
been minimal; it is an open question whether, despite its stated objective of 
additionality, the EEP merely displaced commercial exports. 
Around  seventy-five firms have sold and delivered commodity certificates 
under the program. Many of these firms are foreign owned but have been incor- 
porated for business in the United States. The four largest exporters (Cargill, 
Continental Grain, Louis Dreyfus, and Artfer) account for 65 percent of total 
EEP bonuses received, each receiving over $100 million in bonuses. 
10.1.6  Evaluation of the EEP 
As previously mentioned, policy makers consider the EEP a success. This 
assessment  is based on the fact that, after the introduction  of the EEP, U.S. 
wheat exports started increasing, suggesting that the additionality criterion was 
being met, while government stocks started dropping, suggesting that budget 
neutrality  and cost effectiveness  were being  satisfied as well. By  1990, the 
stocks were reduced to the lowest level since the mid-1970s; the concern about 
how to reduce the wheat surpluses has given way  to the question of optimal 
stock size. 282  Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg and Michael M. Knetter 
The academic community, however, has been more skeptical in its evalua- 
tion of the EEP. On the theoretical side, it is not obvious that additionality will 
be met since subsidies will be inframarginal  owing to the targeted nature of 
the program.  Critics also point  out that the wheat export increase  coincides 
with several favorable developments in the international markets, and isolating 
the contribution of the EEP is therefore difficult. Some of the factors suspected 
of  having increased wheat exports independent of the program were the low 
yields in export-competing countries because of the drought, the depreciation 
of the U.S. dollar, the low loan rate legislated in 1985, and the large increase 
in demand by  the Soviet Union and China. To isolate the effects of the EEP, 
economists have constructed detailed models of the world wheat market and 
simulated the effects of alternative policy scenarios. As usual with this type of 
analysis, the results depend on the particular assumptions that the research is 
willing to make about the behavior of the economic agents and the functional 
forms. 
One of the most important assumptions in this context concerns the response 
of  the other export-competing nations, the EC in particular,  to the EEP. Ac- 
cording to the USDA Economic Research Service, EC export restitutions for 
wheat grew from $365 million in 1985 to $1.8 billion in  1988. This increase 
supports the presumption  that,  in  conjunction  with  the dollar  depreciation 
against the ECU and the lower loan rates, the EEP forced the European Com- 
munity  to lower its export prices.  It is, however, an open question  whether 
EC restitutions were targeted to specific countries to counter EEP bonuses or 
whether they were extended globally to achieve domestic EC goals (see Ha- 
ley 1989). 
The evaluation criteria for the EEP are closely related to the FAS guidelines 
for EEP sales approval. In particular, researchers have been interested  in  as- 
sessing whether the program successfully targeted heavily subsidized markets 
and in computing the program’s effects on domestic prices, export volume, and 
export revenues. While the majority of researchers agree that the EEP success- 
fully targeted countries where the European Community had aggressively sub- 
sidized its wheat exports, Anania, Bohman, and Carter (1992) view the Soviet 
Union  and China episodes as evidence that the targets  were partially  deter- 
mined  by  the market power  of  some large-purchasing  countries rather  than 
the European Community’s unfair trade practices. In addition, they claim that, 
because of the European Community’s response to U.S. subsidies, it was other 
exporters and not the European Community that lost market share as a result 
of the EEP; in China, for example, the expansion of the U.S. market share in 
1987 and 1988 occurred at the expense of Australia and Canada. 
The USDA  has  meanwhile been  more concerned with  the  question  of 
whether value-added products are better targets for EEP sales than bulk com- 
modities. Most EEP sales have been targeted to basic grains; some argue that 
processed  commodities are good candidates for the EEP since the European 
Community subsidizes  both bulk and processed  foods. The EEP effects on 283  Causes and Consequences of the EEP for Wheat 
domestic prices are of special interest  since an explicit goal of the EEP has 
been budget neutrality; had domestic prices declined as a result of the EEP, 
higher deficiency payments to the farmers would have been necessary, increas- 
ing the cost of the program. In general, the effect on domestic prices depends 
on two factors. An EEP-induced increase in demand for U.S. exports tends to 
increase domestic prices; on the other hand, the release of EEP bonus com- 
modities from government storage has a dampening effect on domestic prices. 
Most researchers found that-at  least for the years  1985-87-the  EEP had a 
positive, although modest, effect on domestic prices. The exact magnitude of 
the price effects depends on assumptions about how aggressively the European 
Community subsidized its exports in response to the EEP. Haley (1989), for 
example, estimates that assuming that in the absence of the EEP the European 
Community would have uniformly subsidized its exports at $90.00 per metric 
ton implies a U.S. domestic price increase of 7 percent.  If, however, one as- 
sumes that the European Community had targeted specific markets indepen- 
dent of the EEP, the effect of the program on domestic prices is much larger: 
over 22 percent. These results are in sharp contrast with Anania, Bohman, and 
Carter (1992), who simulated price effects for the year  1988; they find that, 
because of  the release of commodity surpluses from government stocks, do- 
mestic prices in the United States went down during that year; as a result, the 
budgetary cost of  deficiency payments increased. 
With respect to export volume and revenues, most studies find that wheat 
exports rose because of the EEP; the additionality of the program is estimated 
between 2 and 30 percent, with the highest increases concentrated in the years 
1986-87.  It is generally agreed that the EEP displaced to some extent unsubsi- 
dized commercial sales to certain countries;  competing exporters  displaced 
from markets subsidized through the EEP moved into other untargeted markets 
where the United States used to be a major supplier. Because of  the simultane- 
ous increase of U.S. market prices and export volume, gross export revenues 
rose as a result of the EEP; the effect on net revenues, however, is less clear. 
The latter  are computed by  subtracting  the  economic cost of  the bonuses 
awarded to exporters under the EEP from the gross revenues. For the period 
1985-89,  this cost is equal to the value of the surplus commodities in the gov- 
ernment stocks minus the storage cost the government would have incurred 
had these products  not been  used in the EEP. Using this cost measure, it is 
estimated that the EEP led to a slight increase in revenues of about 1 percent. 
A current issue of special interest is whether the EEP has encouraged U.S. 
trading partners to negotiate. The United States has used the EEP as a negotiat- 
ing tool in the GATT negotiations, offering to eliminate the program if other 
countries cut their export subsidies. Although the expansion of EEP sales has 
coincided with progress in the Uruguay  Round, it is unclear  precisely  what 
role the EEP has played in the trade negotiations. 
In summary, most existing studies find that the EEP had small but positive 
effects on exports and domestic prices. It is interesting to note that all the work 284  Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg and Michael M. Knetter 
cited above refers to the period 1985-88;  little is known about the EEP effects 
in subsequent years. But  1985-88  represents exactly the years that coincide 
with a sharp depreciation of the dollar and a decrease in loan rates. It is thus 
an interesting question to what extent the decline in US. exports in the early 
1980s was caused by the relatively high value of the dollar as opposed to the 
EC subsidization and whether US. subsidies played a significant role in in- 
creasing U.S. exports beyond the level to which these would have risen as a 
result of exchange rate changes. The following sections address these questions 
by relating acreage, production, and export shares of U.S. wheat producers to 
exchange rates, loan rates, and subsidies for various time periods. Before mov- 
ing to estimation, we next discuss the data used in our analysis. 
10.2  Data 
One attractive aspect of studying the market for wheat is that the USDA and 
other national and international organizations track agricultural production and 
marketing in great detail. Consequently, there is a wide array of data sources 
from which to choose. 
The analyses that follow rely on two different data sources. The first is the 
World Wheat Situation and Outlook Yearbook. In particular, we used annual 
data from this publication to construct measures of  the U.S. and other com- 
peting countries’ shares of world wheat acreage, production, and exports. This 
publication also provides data on U.S. market prices, support prices, and end- 
ing stocks held by  the federal government. We focus on the period  1970-93 
for most of  our work,  with careful attention paid  to the pre- and post-EEP 
subperiods. Additional information on subsidization in the United States and 
other competing countries was obtained from Estimates of Producer and Con- 
Sumer Subsidy Equivalents. Subsidy data are available for only a limited num- 
ber of  years in different countries, usually  1983-92.  These data are used to 
evaluate the success of the EEP and other policy instruments in influencing the 
level of U.S. wheat production and exports. 
The second of our data sources is destination-specific data on the value and 
quantity of  wheat exports provided  by  a statistical office of the USDA Eco- 
nomic Research Service (ERS). These are annual data from the period 1975- 
94. We use these data to assess the effect of the EEP on U.S. prices relative to 
prices in export markets. 
10.3  Empirical Evidence 
This section of the paper describes how we use the data to shed some light 
on several important questions concerning the EEP and other government sup- 
port instruments, such as the loan rate. As mentioned in section 10.1, previous 
research on these questions has relied on simulations of models of the world 285  Causes and Consequences of the EEP for Wheat 
wheat market. Since it is difficult to compare and evaluate such models owing 
to the myriad assumptions that underlie them, these models have not produced 
a consensus  view on the effect of the EEP. Our aim is to see what the data 
suggest about the effect of  agricultural policies. We make no attempt to esti- 
mate a structural model of behavior since we lack sufficient information on 
participation and set-aside rates for the wheat programs. We will instead esti- 
mate reduced-form  equations that include some key policy  and market vari- 
ables. We will explore the stability of these reduced forms to ensure that our 
results are not too fragile to draw conclusions from the data. 
Our first objective is to determine how relative cost changes and policy mea- 
sures affected the behavior of the U.S. share of total wheat acreage, production, 
and exports. We choose to focus on shares of the so-called competitor group 
(defined as Argentina, Australia,  Canada, the European Community, and the 
United States) totals, as opposed to physical quantities of output. Focusing on 
competitor group shares allows us to abstract from the effect of world demand 
shocks and supply shocks emanating from producers outside the competitor 
group on the physical quantity measures observed for the group. 
Wheat  growers are probably  best viewed as making  sequential decisions 
regarding (1) how much acreage to plant, (2) how intensively to cultivate the 
planted acreage, and (3)  how to allocate output between domestic and export 
markets, where domestic markets include the option of  selling to the govern- 
ment at the loan rate if private market prices would be lower than the loan rate. 
Decisions should be a function of policy variables, such as loan rates and set- 
aside requirements, and relative costs of production. Since exchange rate fluc- 
tuations constitute shifts in relative costs of production, they will be our main 
proxy  for market  conditions  faced by  U.S.  exporters  in  the  international 
wheat market. 
Timing issues complicate our analysis. At each stage, more relevant infor- 
mation is revealed  to producers.  For example, the exchange rate prevailing 
when the export versus domestic sales decision must be made is not known at 
the time of the acreage and production decisions. In fact, it is likely that wheat 
production decisions might respond to the previous period’s relative cost and 
demand conditions rather than the conditions that prevail at harvest time. The 
conditions at harvest time will  influence the export decision  only. Dynamic 
links may also arise because policy responds to the behavior of stocks, which 
in turn are affected by market conditions prevailing in the previous period. 
Simple OLS exploration of the acreage and production shares confirms the 
importance of  market conditions and, to a lesser extent, government policies 
on outcomes. Table 10.1 reports the results of an OLS regression of US.  acre- 
age share on a constant, acreage in the prior period, the (log of  the) lagged real 
exchange rate index of the U.S. dollar relative to the competitor group (using 
weights for group members provided by the USDA in construction of  its in- 
dex), and the (log of the real) loan rate. Changes in the real exchange rate have 286  Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg and Michael M. Knetter 
Table 10.1  U.S. Wheat Acreage Share Regression, 1971-93 
Coefficient  SE  r-Statistic 
Constant 
ACUSSHR(-  1) 
RXCOMP( -  1) 
LRLOANRT 
Dependent variable 
No. of  observations 
SD of  dependent variable 
SE of  regression 
R' 
Durbin-Watson  statistic 
8.30799  2.405  3  6  3.45  395 
SO7 102  ,144802  3.50203 
-5.36061  2.41292  -2.22163 







a direct effect on the common currency relative costs of the competitor group 
vis-2-vis the United States. An increase in the index (a real appreciation of the 
dollar) will increase U.S. relative costs. 
The results show that acreage is indeed significantly influenced by  the real 
exchange rate but is insensitive to the loan rate for the period  1971-93.  Since 
the dependent variable is in share percentage points and the exchange rate is 
in logs, the estimated coefficient implies that a 10 percent appreciation of the 
dollar will lead to a reduction in U.S. acreage share of 0.5 percentage points 
in the following wheat year. A similar regression using the contemporaneous 
exchange rate produced insignificant results. This is not surprising since the 
relevant  choices  are  made  before  the  contemporaneous  exchange  rate  is 
known. The lack of a significant relation between loan rates and acreage proba- 
bly reflects the fact that higher loan rates coincide with larger set-aside require- 
ments. In the absence of such a relation, one would expect high loan rates to 
encourage more a~reage.~ 
Table 10.2 reports the analogous regression for the U.S. production share.4 
The results are very similar with respect  to the effect of  exchange rates on 
production. The estimated coefficient on the exchange rate implies that a  10 
percent real dollar appreciation leads to a reduction in the U.S.  share of group 
production of 0.8 percentage points. Production is also significantly, positively 
related to loan rates. The estimated model implies that a 10 percent increase in 
the loan rate leads to a 0.4 percentage point increase in the U.S. share of com- 
petitor group production. The fact that loan rates are positively related to pro- 
duction, but not to acreage, suggests that the production effect of  loan rates 
3. We tested to see whether lagged stocks were helpful in explaining acreage. They were highly 
correlated with  lagged exchange rates, but  neither variable  was significant  when both  were  in- 
cluded in  the model. Since the model fit best  with  exchange rates instead of  stocks, we report 
that specification. 
4. Including lagged production has almost no effect on the model, so we left it out in the interest 
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Table 10.2  U.S. Wheat Production Share Regression, 1971-93 
Coefficient  SE  t-Statistic 
Constant  18.6095  .4 10900  45.2895 
RXCOMP( -  I)  -  1.60734  3.78993  -2.00725 
LRLOANRT  4.27263  1.24511  3.43152 
Dependent variable 
No. of observations 
SD of dependent variable 









Table 10.3  U.S. Wheat Export Share Regression, 1970-93 
Coefficient  SE  r-Statistic 
Constant  31.7959 
RXCOMP  -29.9157 
LRLOANRT  11.5216 
Dependent variable 
No. of observations 
SD of dependent variable 
SE of  regression 
R' 
Durbin-Watson statistic 
42.2110  ,895404 
8.32227  -  3.59466 







works through yields. Farmers can apparently offset some of the acreage set- 
aside requirements to take advantage of higher loan rates. 
Table 10.3 shows the results for the analogous equation using U.S. export 
share as the dependent variable. The exchange rate used here is the contempo- 
raneous exchange rate rather than the lagged exchange rate used in the acreage 
and production equations. The current exchange rate determines the relative 
benefit of export sales versus sales to the CCC. Table 10.3 shows that exchange 
rates and loan rates together explain a great deal of variation in the U.S. export 
share over the period 1970-93,  with an R2 value of .60. Each of the regressors 
is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The exchange rate coefficient 
implies that a  10 percent  appreciation  of  the dollar leads to a 3 percentage 
point reduction in the U.S. export share. Meanwhile, a 10 percent increase in 
the loan rate leads to a 1.2 percentage point increase in U.S. export shares. The 
link between loan rates and exports is likely to be quite complex. High loan 
rates stimulate production, and high production periods are also likely to be 
high export periods, for given values of the exchange rate. Later in the paper, 
we explore this linkage in more detail using  an instrumental  variables pro- 
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Table 10.4  U.S. Wheat Stocks Regression, 1970-93 





No. of observations 
SD of dependent variable 
SE of regression 
R' 
Durbin-Watson statistic 
27,330.8  1,670.43  16.3616 
68,062.8  15,525.7  4.38389 







Table 10.5  U.S. Wheat Export Share Regression, 1970-85 





No. of observations 
SD of dependent variable 
SE of regression 
R' 
Durbin-Watson statistic 
40.8789  1.69523  24.1141 
-35.1576  8.59 I86  -4.09197 







Table 10.4 reports the behavior of U.S. government wheat stocks in relation 
to exchange rates and loan rates. Not surprisingly, both variables are statisti- 
cally significant. Either an appreciation of the dollar or an increase in the loan 
rate will lead to an increase in government stocks of wheat by making sales to 
the CCC more attractive relative to export sales. 
Tables 10.1-10.4  all report the results of estimation over the entire period 
1970-93.  Since the implementation of the EEP and other aspects of the  1985 
Farm Bill constituted a major policy shift, it is worth examining the subperiod 
1970-85  separately. The results for exports are reported in table 10.5. We find 
that, in this subperiod, loan rates are unrelated to export shares, with a negative 
point estimate. This is in sharp contrast to our results in table 10.3 above for 
the entire period. The effect of  exchange rates is even more pronounced  in 
this subperiod, however. A  10 percent real dollar appreciation leads to a 3.5 
percentage point reduction in exports according to the estimated coefficients. 
An interesting exercise is to use the reduced-form coefficients of table 10.5 
to project U.S. wheat export shares for the period 1985-93,  in which the EEP 
was put into effect. There is no reason to think that the behavioral  relations 
that generated these reduced-form coefficients would have remained the same 289  Causes and Consequences of the EEP for Wheat 
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Fig. 10.4  Actual, fitted, and predicted U.S. wheat exports based on OLS over 
1970-85 sample 
Source: World Wheat Situation and Outlook Yearbook and authors' calculations. 
with the implementation of the EEP and the other policy changes that occurred 
in  1985. Nonetheless, we think of this projection as one type of  estimate of 
how U.S. wheat export shares might have evolved after 1985 as a result of the 
sharp fall in the value of the dollar had there been no major policy changes in 
the United States or in other competitor group countries. 
The results of this exercise are shown in figure 10.4, which plots the actual, 
fitted, and predicted  shares of  U.S. wheat exports from  1970 to  1993. The 
fitted values are the within-sample estimated values of U.S. export share for 
the 1970-85  sample period. The predicted shares are obtained by substituting 
realized values of the exchange rate and the loan rate from the 1986-93 predic- 
tion period into the regression relation estimated over the sample period. The 
first thing to notice abut the figure is that actual shares are below predicted 
shares for every year of the 1986-93  prediction period. Furthermore, the short- 
fall of  actual relative to predicted  levels rises dramatically after  1989. One 
might have expected just the opposite: that, with the implementation of the 
EEP program, U.S. export shares would increase for given values of the ex- 
change rate and loan rate relative to the pre-EEP period. Since we are pro- 
jecting on the basis of the pre-EEP relation, it is rather puzzling that actual 
values  consistently fall  short of  projected  values.  One interpretation  is  of 
course that the EEP and the policy responses of  competitor countries to the 
EEP actually hindered U.S. exports on balance in the period 1986-93.  How- 
ever, it is likely that other changes in farm policy played a role in this break- 
down in the relation between export shares, exchange rates, and loan rates. 
The results of this regression analysis also underscore the fact that the de- 
cline in U.S. exports in the early to mid-1980s was very much in line with the 
historical relation between the value of the dollar and the U.S. share of compet- 
itor group exports. Indeed, inspection of the residuals, represented by the gap 290  Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg and Michael M. Knetter 
Table 10.6  US. Wheat Export Share Regression, 1970-80 





No. of observations 
SD of dependent variable 
SE of regression 
K' 
Durbin-Watson statistic 
41.2188  1.93237  21.3307 
-35.9205  15.5964  -2.303  13 







between actual and fitted values in figure 10.4, reveals that the model's fitted 
values for US. export shares during the period  1981-84  were less than the 
actual level of US.  export shares in each of those years. Only in 1985 did fitted 
values exceed actual. The fitted values implied a 14 percentage point decline 
in U.S. export shares from 1980 to 1985 owing to the changes in exchange rates 
and loan rates. Actual shares declined 17 percentage points over this period. It 
is not clear that European subsidies could have played a substantial role in the 
collapse of  wheat export markets, above and beyond the effect of  exchange 
rates. They may have magnified the collapse in 1985-86,  according to our in- 
spection of the residuals. 
A potential criticism of  this exercise is that rising European subsidies coin- 
cided with the dramatic appreciation of  the dollar in the early to mid-1980s. 
The biggest increases in European subsidies did occur during 1985. Since no 
subsidy measures are included in the model, the estimated coefficients on the 
exchange rate may be biased upward owing to the omitted variable, which is 
causally related to US.  export share and by chance correlated with the value 
of the dollar. To check the robustness of our results, we estimated our simple 
export share equation over the period 1970-80, during which European subsid- 
ies were not viewed as a big factor and U.S.  wheat export shares were large by 
historical standards. 
The results of estimating the reduced-form export share equation over the 
period  1970-80  are reported in table  10.6. While the standard errors on the 
coefficient  estimates  have  increased  relative  to  the  results  in  table  10.5, 
the exchange rate coefficient remains of similar magnitude and is still statisti- 
cally significant. Figure 10.5 uses the pre-1981 results to project export shares 
using realized values of the exchange rate and the loan rate. These predicted 
values are almost identical to the fitted values obtained when the model was 
estimated over the period  1970-85.  In other words, the relation between ex- 
change rates and export shares over the period  1981-85  appears no different 
from the relation that prevailed from 1970 to 1980. Consequently, it is hard to 291  Causes and Consequences of the EEP for Wheat 
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Source: World Wheat Situatioii and Outlook Yearbook and authors' calculations. 
Actual, fitted, and predicted US.  wheat exports based on OLS over 
believe that the omission of European subsidies is an important factor in ex- 
plaining the data over the period 1981-85.  Export shares behaved very much 
in line with what would have been expected given the evolution of common 
currency  relative costs (proxied  by  the exchange rate) and U.S. government 
policies. 
Data on EC producer subsidy equivalents for wheat were available over the 
period  1982-89  from the USDA Economic Research Service. This is a very 
short sample period, but we wanted to further investigate the relative impor- 
tance of  exchange rates and subsidies for this period. Table  10.7 reports the 
simple regression  of export shares on exchange rates only for this eight year 
period.  While this is a very short sample, there was substantial  variation in 
both  subsidies and exchange rates over the period.  European subsidies  rose 
from just over 3 percent per unit in 1984 to over 50 percent by 1986. The point 
estimate of the coefficient on the exchange rate remains quite close to the val- 
ues obtained on the entire sample and the various subsamples considered thus 
far. It is no longer statistically significant at the 5 percent level owing to the 
smaller sample size, although the marginal significance level for a one-sided 
test is only .06. The results obtained when the data on European wheat subsid- 
ies are added are reported  in  table  10.8. Adding the subsidies does almost 
nothing to the estimated coefficient on the exchange rate or its t-value. Mean- 
while, the coefficient on the subsidy variable has a t-value only slightly greater 
than one. It seems that, even over this period, exchange rates have a more sub- 
stantial effect on export shares than subsidies. The huge increase in European 
subsidies in 1985, from 3.8 percent per unit to 31.1 percent per unit, translates 292  Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg and Michael M. Knetter 
Table 10.7  U.S. Wheat Export Share Regression, 1982-89 
Coefficient  SE  [-Statistic 
Constant  38.6034  2.79318  13.8176 
RXCOMP(  ~  I)  -  39.6450  2 1.9647  -  1.80495 
Dependent variable 
No. of observations 
SD  of dependent variable 









Table 10.8  U.S. Wheat Export Share Regression with European Subsidy 
Variable, 1982-89 





No. of observations 
SD  of dependent variable 
SE of  regression 
K' 
Durbin-Watson statistic 
40.8 149  3.46508  I 1.7789 
-.081783  ,077197  -  1.05940 





I .3227 I 
.470708 
into only a slightly more than 2 percentage point decline in the predicted U.S. 
export share, on the basis of the coefficients in table  10.8. As noted earlier, 
actual shares declined about 17 percentage points from 1980 to 1985. Thus, 
our regression results with both subsidies and exchange rates imply that sub- 
sidies account for very little of the erosion of U.S.  export market shares. Euro- 
pean subsidies may explain the larger than predicted drop in U.S.  export shares 
in  1985 but none of the decline before that. 
As an intermediate step toward a more structuralist approach to modeling 
export shares, we also investigated the behavior of export shares conditional 
on production  shares themselves, in addition to exchange rates. If export and 
production  shares are jointly determined, we need  to use  a two-stage  least 
squares or instrumental variables (IV) procedure. Our earlier work on produc- 
tion  shares suggests that lagged exchange rates might be an ideal instrument 
for this purpose. The IV estimates of the model for the period 1970-85  are 
reported in table  10.9, while the actual, fitted, and predicted values from the 
model are shown in figure 10.6. As can be verified from the table or the figure, 
the IV estimates are nearly identical to the OLS estimates in terms of  their 293  Causes and Consequences of the EEP for Wheat 
Table 10.9  US.  Wheat Export Share Regression Using Instrumental Variables, 
1971-85 





No. of observations 
SD of dependent variable 
SE of regression 
R' 
Durbin-Watson statistic 
28.6351  10.9552 
-34.4867  7.043  17 
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Fig. 10.6  Actual, fitted, and predicted U.S. wheat exports based on IV 
estimation over 1971-85  sample 
Source: World Wheat Situation and Outlook Yearbook and authors' calculations. 
implications  for the  role  of  exchange  rates  in  explaining  the  behavior  of 
wheat exports. 
All the evidence on export shares points to the same basic conclusion: that 
the overvaluation  of  the dollar was primarily responsible for the collapse of 
U.S. wheat exports from 1981 to 1985. The spike in European  subsidies in 
1985-86  may have contributed a few percentage points to the decline in U.S. 
wheat export shares, but the damage had largely  been done by that point in 
time. 
What was the effect of the EEP on export shares of US.  producers? There 
is nothing in the overall performance  of exports to suggest that the EEP and 
the ensuing subsidy war with the EC left U.S. exporters with a larger share of 
world  markets  than  would  have been  obtained  without  the EEP. For every 294  Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg and Michael M. Knetter 
Table 10.10  Relative Wheat Prices during the EEP 





No. of  observations 
SD of  dependent variable 
SE of regression 
R' 
Durbin-Watson statistic 
-  .83  1739  ,099076  -  8.39496 
.206 136  ,212107  .97 1845 




,797  199 
,0566  14 
1.78274 
model of wheat export shares estimated in this paper, the out-of-sample projec- 
tions of wheat export  shares conditional on realized values  of the exchange 
rate  and other factors  (such as loan rates and production  shares)  show  that 
actual exports began  to turn down substantially  relative to projections  after 
1988. 
This breakdown  in the relation between export shares, exchange rates, and 
loan rates may reflect other aspects of farm policy. In particular, there is some 
evidence that  set-aside  requirements became more  stringent  after  1985: the 
simple correlation between loan rates and acreage shares switched from being 
0.28 over the period 1970-85  to -0.58  in the period  1986-94.  This suggests 
that, while higher loan rates encouraged participation in farm programs, they 
were combined with tighter restrictions on acreage than had previously been 
the case. Thus, the decline in export shares may have been the result of policy- 
driven reductions  in US. acreage share. Without a detailed structural model 
and the necessary information on target prices, loan rates, set-asides, and par- 
ticipation rates, we cannot be sure what is driving behavior over this period. 
A final question of interest is the effect of the EEP on U.S. wheat prices. 
Our approach  to this  issue is to compare the level  of  U.S.  domestic  wheat 
prices with the level of U.S. export prices to different regions in the pre- and 
post-EEP periods. Wheat export destinations are grouped into thirteen regions, 
and  regional  export  unit  values  per  bushel  are  calculated  for  the  period 
1975-93  on an annual basis. We then regress a measure of the price difference 
(U.S. price minus export region price) on a constant, an EEP dummy (which 
equals one in EEP periods and zero otherwise), and the loan rate (which may 
influence the relative price of what in the United States). The results for the 
regression that pools all the export regions into a single regression are given in 
table  10.10. The point estimate on the EEP dummy suggests that  the price 
differential changed such that relative prices in the United States rose by $0.21 
during the EEP period,  but  the coefficient  is not  statistically  significant. In 
estimation on a region-by-region  basis, the only region where prices fell sig- 
nificantly  relative to the United States was North Africa, a huge recipient of 295  Causes and Consequences of the EEP for Wheat 
EEP-subsidized wheat. These regression results suggest that the effect of the 
EEP on US. domestic prices was modest. 
10.4  Conclusion 
This paper has attempted to use regression analysis to study the effect of the 
Export Enhancement Program on U.S. wheat exports. We find that measures 
of change in common currency relative costs of  the competitor group of  ex- 
porters have important effects on production,  acreage, and export shares as 
well as government wheat stocks. Policy variables, such as the loan rate, also 
have important effects on these outcomes in most of our specifications. 
The main findings of our analysis are as follows. The decline of U.S. export 
market shares in wheat during the early and mid-1980s can be attributed pri- 
marily to the appreciation of the dollar. In fact, our simple regression model of 
export market shares as a function of exchange rates and loan rates does quite 
well at out-of-sample prediction of the evolution of export shares for the period 
198 1-85.  This finding holds up in a number of different specifications of the 
export share model. Furthermore, results for a small subperiod in which Euro- 
pean wheat subsidies per unit are available suggest that the subsidies explain 
only about 2 percentage points of the 17 percentage point decline in U.S. ex- 
port market share from 1980 to 1985. It appears inaccurate to blame the col- 
lapse of wheat exports on the EC subsidies and, consequently, dubious to at- 
tempt to rectify the situation with countervailing subsidies, such as the EEP. 
Ironically, shortly after the implementation of the EEP, the dollar underwent 
a drastic real depreciation. Nonetheless, the EEP program grew substantially 
over the period we study. This may reflect a more general phenomenon:  that 
one of the costs of exchange rate misalignments might be the adoption of tem- 
porary  import protection  or export promotion  programs  that are difficult  to 
remove even after the realignment of exchange rates. Had historical relations 
between the U.S. export share, the dollar, and loan rates prevailed after 1985, 
U.S. wheat export shares would have recovered almost fully to their 1980 lev- 
els by the end of the decade. However, the historical relations no longer appear 
to hold, which  is perhaps  a consequence of  the EEP, other changes in farm 
programs, and competitor country subsidies in influencing wheat market be- 
havior. The fact that the EEP is not a subsidy that operates at the margin im- 
plies that it is at least plausible that it would have little effect on export shares. 
If  the EEP was not successful in restoring U.S. exports, at least it did not 
appear to be very harmful to US.  consumers. The price of wheat in the United 
States relative to the average export price from the United States to various 
regions changed very little after the EEP was implemented. On the other hand, 
this  means  that the  EEP was  not  successful  in reducing  the  need  for other 
support measures for farmers. 296  Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg and Michael M. Knetter 
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